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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
COLIN K. HAMILTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
U.C.A. Section 78-2a-3(2)(c). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a bench trial in which the Defendant, 
Colin Hamilton, was found guilty of driving under the influence 
of alcohol in violation of U.C.A. Section 41-6-44. The Trial 
Judge specifically found that the Defendant had been operating a 
motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content of .08 or greater. 
The Trial Judge further indicated that he had a reasonable doubt 
as to whether the Defendant was intoxicated to a degree that he 
could not operate a motor vehicle safely. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Respondent believes that Appellant's first issue presented 
for review would be governed by U.C.A. Section 77-35-17(g), in 
particular subsections (3), (4) and (5), which are set out in the 
Case No. 880422-CA 
Category 2 
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addendum, attached to the end of this brief* 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Defendant, Colin K. Hamilton, hereinafter referred 
to as "Hamilton" was pulled over April 2, 1988, shortly before 
11:00 p.m., driving a truck that had no tail lights. (Trial 
Transcript, p. 4.) 
2. After observing the odor of alcohol, Deputy Rick 
Harrison, hereinafter referred to as "Harrison", asked Hamilton 
to complete several field sobriety tests. Hamilton indicated 
that he had had something to drink. (Trial Transcript, p. 5-6.) 
3f Based on the field sobriety tests, Harrison placed 
Hamilton under arrest for DUI. (Trial Transcript, p. 7.) 
4. After arriving at thfc Sheriff's Department, Hamilton 
and the Jailer, Paul Adams, hereinafter referred to as "Adams", 
observed that Hamilton had a lifesaver in his mouth. Hamilton 
was asked to remove the lifeseiver, and upon removal, Harrison 
"filled out some paperwork, waited the 15 minutes, and then had 
Mr. Hamilton take the intoxilyzer test". (Trial Transcript, p. 
7, lines 13-19.) 
5. Harrison observed Hamilton during the 15 minute waiting 
period. (Trial Transcript, p. 16, line 19.) 
6. The time of arrest was recorded as being 2300. (Trial 
Transcript, p. 13, lines 2-4.) 
7. Adams searched the vehicle Hamilton had been driving at 
2310. (Trial Transcript, p. 13.) 
8. The intoxilyzer test given to Hamilton began at 2322. 
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(Trial Transcript, p. 17, lines 8-10.) 
9. The clock used to determine the time of arrest was not 
the clock used to time the 15 minutes between the removal of the 
lifesaver and the beginning of the intoxilyzer test. (Trial 
Transcript, p. 17, lines 15-17.) 
10. Adams1 watch was used to time the 15 minute waiting 
period. (Trial Transcript, p. 20, lines 1-10, and p. 21, lines 
12-17.) 
11. The 15 minute waiting period began prior to Adams1 
search of the vehicle. (Trial Transcrip:, p. 22, lines 20-25, 
and p. 23, lines 15-20.) 
12. Both Adams and Harrison testified that 15 minutes 
elapsed between the lifesaver beihg spit out and the beginning of 
the intoxilyzer test. (Trial Transcript, p. 7, lines 13-17; p. 
17, lines 4-5; p. 21, lines 16-17; p. 24, lines 19-22; and p. 32, 
lines 3-17.) 
13. During the course of the trial, Hamilton's Counsel 
objected to the admission of the results of the intoxilyzer test 
on the basis of Baker's 15 minute waiting period requirement four 
(4) times. (Trial Transcript, p. 9, 18, 20 and 24.) 
14. As part of the first objection, Counsel asked for 
permission to voir dire the witness and the Court withheld any 
ruling on the objection, until Counsel had "an opportunity to 
cross-examine." (Trial Transcript, p. 9, lines 2-12.) 
15. After the voir dire, and further questioning, the State 
rested and moved for the admission of the test results. 
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Hamilton's Counsel objected that the 15 minute waiting period had 
not been established. (Trial Transcript, p. 18, lines 10-18.) 
16. The Court replied "That's right", and Hamilton's 
Counsel moved to exclude the test. The State moved to re-open. 
Hamilton's Counsel objected as the State had just rested. (Trial 
Transcript, p. 18, lines 18-25.) 
17. The Court ruled that the State could re-open and stated 
that it had not ruled on the State's motion to admit the test 
results. (Trial Transcript, p. 18, line 25, and p. 29, lines 1-
2.) 
18. Hamilton's Counsel objected a third time during the 
State's examination of Deputy Paul A. Adams. (Trial Transcript, 
p. 20, lines 17-21.) 
19. After Adams' testimony, the State moved to admit the 
test results and Hamilton's Counsel objected to the admission a 
fourth time. (Trial Transcript, p. 24, lines 23-25, p. 25, lines 
1-10.) 
20. The Court ruled that the 15 minute time requirement of 
Baker had been shown and admitted the test results into evidence. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 25, lines 19-22, and p. 33, lines 3-17.) 
21. The Court found Hamilton guilty of violating U.C.A. 
Section 41-6-44, operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol 
content of .08 or greater, based on Hamilton's intoxilyzer test 
results showing a bJood alcohol level of .17. (Trial Transcript, 
p. 41, lines 1-16. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State will argue that the Trial Court committed no error 
and that there was sufficient evidence to support its finding of 
guilty. In particular, the State will argue that the Court did 
not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecution to re-open 
its case, and that the foundational requirements for the 
admissibility of a breath test in accordance with Baker, were 
complied with. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO 
RE-OPEN ITS CASE 
A. THE TRIAL COURT HAS DISCRETION AS TO THE ORDER OF 
PROOF AND IN DETERMINING WHETHER TO GRANT A MOTION 
TO RE-OPEN 
The order that a criminal trial should proceed ds governed 
by U.C.A. Section 77-35-17(g), Rule 17 of the Utah Code of 
Criminal Procedure. It provides that the prosecution should 
offer evidence in support of the charge. After the prosecution 
has rested, the defense should present its case. Then, each side 
may offer rebutting evidence "unless the court, for good cause, 
otherwise permits.11, [U.C.A. Section 77-35-17(g)(5)]. 
l n
 State v. Greqorious, 81 U.33, 16 P.2d 893 (1933), the 
Defendant was charged with having committed an infamous crime 
against nature. The prosecution1s only witness was the victim, a 
15 year old boy. After his testimony, the State rested. The 
defense then made a Motion for a Directed Verdict on several 
grounds, including that the prosecution's witness was an 
accomplice, and therefore his testimony required corroboration. 
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The State indicated that because of the victim's youth, it felt 
no corroboration was necessary. There was further discussion and 
a recess was taken. After the recess, the State asked to re-
open its case and introduce corroborating evidence. The defense 
objected, but the Court allowed the State to re-open its case and 
give further evidence. The Supreme Court held that "(i)t was 
within the discretion of the court to permit the case to be re-
opened. No abuse of discretion is shown in doing so." 16 P.2d 
at 895. 
In both Gregorious and this case, after the State rested, 
the defense raised an objection to the evidence based on legal 
requirements for admissibility. In both cases, the legal 
requirements for the admissibility of evidence were designed to 
ensure the evidence's creditability. Ir both cases, if the 
evidence were excluded, there would be no basis for conviction of 
the Defendant. In both cases, the Trial Court allowed the 
prosecution to re-open its case and introduce evidence which 
clearly complied with the legal requirements for the 
admissability of the evidence originally introduced and objected 
to. In both cases, it was within the discretion of the Trial 
Court to allow the case to be re-opened. The defense was not 
able to show an abuse of discretion by the Trial Court's action 
in either case. In this case, Defendant has argued that the 
Court abused its discretion because the evidence was admitted and 
Defendant was convicted based on that evidence. Clearly, that 
was also the result in the Gregorious case. It seems likely that 
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that would be the result in most cases where one party has a need 
to re-open its case. That is not a basis for finding an abuse of 
discretion by the Trrial Court, 
State v. Greqorious has not been overturned by the courts of 
Utah, and was cited with approval in State v. Duncan, 102 U.449, 
132 P.2d 121 (1942). 
The Utah ruling in Greqorious is in line with other states. 
The only limitation appears to be that the opposing party must be 
given a fair and full opportunity to rebut the new evidence. 
Clearly, Hamilton was given adequate opportunity to cross-examine 
the witnesses and re-butt the new evidence introduced after the 
State re-opened. 
In State v. Cutler, 94 Idaho 295, 486 P.2d 1008 (1971), the 
Idaho Supreme Court stated "(i)t is within the discretion of the 
trial court to allow a party to re-open its case after it has 
rested and that decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless 
there is a manifest abuse of such discretion." 486 P.2d at 1011• 
In State v. Burbank, 156 Me.269, 163 A.2d 639 (I960), the 
Maine Court stated that "(a)justice presiding in a criminal case 
not only has the responsibility of protecting the rights of one 
accused of crime but also an equal responsibility to the people 
of the State to the end that justice is not thwarted by mistake 
or inadvertence." 
Also see Jones v. State, 584 P.2d 224 (Okla.Cr., 1978); 
State v. Loftin, 76 Wash.2d 350 458 P.2d 29 (1969); State v. 
Sage, 20 Ore.App. 368, 531 P.2d 707 (1975); State v. Taylor, 112 
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Ariz. 68, 537 P.2d 938, cert, denied 96 S.Ct. 1327, 424 U.S. 921, 
47 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975); State v. Carmichael, 240 Kan.149, 727 P.2d 
918 (1986); and People v. Green, 164 Cal.Rptr.l, 27 C.3d 1, 609 
P.2d 468 (1980) . 
B. THE COURT DID NOT RULE THAT THE BREATH TEST RESULTS 
WERE INADMISSIBLE 
Hamilton relies on the Court's comment of "That's right" 
(Trial Transcript, p. 18, line 18) to support his assertion that 
the Court ruled the breath test results inadmissible. 
The whole exchange is as follows: 
MR. GILLESPIE: State rests, your Honor. 
We'd re-move for admission of the test 
results. 
MR. SOUVALL: your Honor, Ifd renew my 
objection to the admission. I believe there's been no 
competent testimony here that the required 15-minute 
period was observed. The deputy said he thought it was 
observed, but he can't testify personally that he knew 
it was observed, because he didn't time it. 
THE COURT: That's right. 
MR. SOUVALL: On that basis, I move to 
exclude the test. 
MR. GILLESPIE: We would move to be allowed 
to re-open, your Honor. 
MR. SOUVALL: Object. The State just rested. 
MR. GILLESPIE: Well — 
THE COURT: He may re-open. I didn't—I 
didn't rule upon his motion to admit; that was under 
advisement, I hadn't ruled upon it. 
He may re-open. (Trial Transcript, p. 18, 
lines 10-25, p. 19, lines 1-3.) 
Clearly, the only motion before the Court when it said "That's 
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right11 was the State's Motion to admit the test results. The 
Court's comment is in response to Souvall's comment that Harrison 
did not time the 15 minute period, and, in the Court's own 
opinion, did not consist a ruling on the State's Motion. Even 
Souvall felt that more was needed as he immediately moved to 
exclude the test. This motion makes no sense if the Court had 
already held that the breath test was inadmissible. Soxivall's 
second objection was based on the fact that the State rested, not 
that the Court had already ruled on the admissibility of the 
test. Clearly, no one felt that the Court's comment of "That's 
right" consisted a ruling on whether the test was admissible or 
not at the time of trial. 
POINT II. THERE WAS COMPLIANCE WITH THE FOUNDATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
OF THE BAKER RULE 
Under State v. Baker, 56 Wash.2d 846, 355 P.2d 806 (1960) 
requires observation of the alleged drunk driver for at least 
fifteen minutes prior to administering a intoxilyzer test. 
Hamilton's counsel alleges that strict compliance with the rule 
is necessary. 
A. WAS THE OBSERVATION REQUIREMENT MET? 
In this case, Harrison observed Hamilton for 15 minutes 
prior to giving the intoxilyzer test. (See Trial Transcript, p. 
7, lines 17-17, and p. 16, line 19.) Deputy Adams' watch was 
used to time the 15 minutes (See Trial Transcript, p. 20, lines 
1-10). Adams also testified that 15 minutes had elapsed (See 
Trial Transcript, p. 21, lines 12-17). 
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Both Adams1 and Harrison's testimony supports a finding that 
Hamilton was observed by Harrison for 15 minutes prior to the 
test to insure that Hamilton had not ingested anything into his 
mouth or regurgitated and to allow alcohol present in his mouth 
to be absorbed. State v. Baker, 56 Wash.2d 846, 355 P.2d 806 at 
811 (1960). As Harrison was also the operator of the test, he 
had direct, persoral knowledge that there was strict compliance 
with the foundational requirements of a 15 minute observation 
period. State v. McVay, 83 Or. App. 312, 731 P.23 466 (1987). 
B. DID 15 MINUTES ELAPSE? 
In this case, unlike State 7. McVay, 83 Or. App 312, 731 
P.2d 466 (1987) cited by Hamilton, Harrison observed Hamilton for 
15 minutes and operated the test. He did not observe the watch 
used to time the test. Obviously, Harrison could not watch the 
clock and Harrison at the same time. The State would allege that 
the fact that the watch used to time the 15 minutes need not be 
owned by or in the physical presence of the test operator in 
order to make sure Baker's requirements are met before the test 
is administered. 
Hamilton also alleges that only 12 minutes elapsed between 
the lifesaver being spit out and the beginning of the test. He 
bases this conclusion on the time that Adams conducted the search 
of Hamilton's vehicle. However, the State would point out that 
the timing of the waiting period began before the vehicle was 
searched, and therefore, more than 12 minutes elapsed before the 
test began, rather than only 12 minutes having elapsed. The 
PagelO 
evidence is consistent with a finding by the Court that the 
foundational requirements of Baker had been complied with. 
"A verdict will be overturned only when the evidence is so 
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not have 
reached that verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard of 
review is the same whether the finder of fact is a trial judge or 
a jury". (citations oamitted) State v. Isaacson, 704 P.2d 555 
(Utah, 1985). 
CONCLUSION 
There is direct competent evidence in this case to support 
the Court's findings and the Court did not abuse its discretion 
in its ruling. Therefore, the Court's decision must be upheld on 
appeal. 
DATED this 29th day of November, 1988. 
ATTORNEYS FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY: 
IS /// / 
Mache|le Fitzgerald 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on the 29th day of November, 1988, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT, postage prepaid, to Harry H. Souvall, McRAE & DeLAND, 
Attorney for Appellant, 209 East 100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078, 
by depositing the same in the United States Post Office at 
Roosevelt, Utah. 
/%d:<((f[-^t7^iW 
Attorney ' /){ 
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77-35-16 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 248 
that persons operating the closed circuit equip-
ment film both the child and the defendant dur-
ing the child's testimony, so that the jury may 
view both the child and the defendant, if that 
may be arranged without violation of other re-
quirements of Subsection (2). 
(3) In any case concerning a charge of child abuse 
or of a sexual offense against a child, the court may 
order, upon motion of -he prosecution and for good 
cause shown, that the testimony of any witness or 
victim younger than 14 years of age be taken outside 
the courtroom and be recorded. That testimony is ad-
missible as evidence, for viewing in any court pro-
ceeding regarding the charges if the provisions of 
Subsection (2) are observed, in addition to the follow-
ing provisions: 
(a) the recording is both visual and aural and 
recorded on film or videotape or by other elec-
tronic means; 
(b) the recording equipment is capable of mak-
ing an accurate recording, the operator is compe-
tent, and the recording is accurate and is not al-
tered; 
(c) each voice on the recording is identified; 
and 
(d) each party is given an opportunity to view 
the recording before it is shown in the courtroom. 
(4) If the court orders tha t the testimony of a child 
be taken under Subsection (2) or (3), the child may 
not be required to testify in court a t any proceeding 
where the recorded testimony is used. 1988 
77-35-16. Rule 16 — Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor 
shall disclose to the defense upon request the follow-
ing material or information of which he has knowl-^ 
edge: 
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements of 
the defendant or co-defendants; 
(2) The criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) Physical evidence seized from the defen-
dant or co-defendant; 
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor that 
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate 
the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree 
of the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) Any other item of evidence which the court 
determines on good cause shown should be made 
available to the defendant in order for the defen-
dant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as 
soon as practicable following the filing of charges and 
before the defendant is required to plead. The prose-
cutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, 
the defense shall disclose to the prosecutor such infor-
mation as required by statute relating to alibi or in-
sanity and any other item of evidence which the court 
determines on good cause shown should be made 
available to the prosecutor in order for the prosecutor 
to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attor-
ney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before 
trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing 
duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the 
prosecutor or defense may make disclosure by notify-
ing the opposing party that material and information 
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reason-
able times and places. 
if) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any 
time order that discovery or inspection be denied, re-
stricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is 
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may 
permit the party to make such showing, in whole or 
in part, in the form of a written statement to be in-
spected by the judge alone. If the court enters an or-
der granting relief following such an ex parte show-
ing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be 
sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be 
made available to the appellate court in the event of 
an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceed-
ings it is brought to the attention of the court that a 
party has failed to comply with this rule, the court 
may order such party to permit the discovery or in-
spection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party 
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may 
enter such other order as it deems just under the cir-
cumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the ac-
cused may be required to: 
(1) Appear in a lineup; 
(2) Speak for identification; 
(3) Submit to fingerprinting or the making of 
other bodily impressions; 
(4) Pose for photographs not involving reenact-
ment of the crime; 
(5) Try on articles of clothing or other items of 
disguise; 
(6) Permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, 
fingernail scrapings, and other bodily materials 
which can be obtained without unreasonable in-
trusion; 
(7) Provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) Submit to reasonable physical or medical 
inspection of his body; and 
(9) Cut hair or allow hair to grow to approxi-
mate appearance at the time of the alleged of-
fense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the ac-
cused is required for the foregoing purposes, rea-
sonable notice of the time and place of such appear-
ance shall be given to the accused and his counsel. 
Failure of the accused to appear or to comply with 
the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by 
order of the court, without reasonable excuse shall 
be grounds for revocation of pre-trial release, may 
be offered as evidence in the prosecutors case in 
chief for consideration along with other evidence 
concerning the guilt of the accused and shall be 
subject to such further sanctions as the court 
should deem appropriate. i960 
77-35-17. Rule 17 — The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right 
to appear and defend in person and by counsel. The 
defendant shall be personally present at the trial 
with the following exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and in-
fractions, defendant may consent in writing to 
trial in his absence; . 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable 
by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from 
the trial after notice to defendant of the time for 
trial shall not prevent the case from being tried 
and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall 
have the same effect as if defendant had been 
present; and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defen-
dant from trial for good cause shown which may 
include tumultuoi s, riotous, or obstreperous con-
duct. 
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Upon application of the prosecution, the court may 
require the personal attendance of the defendant at 
the trial. 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be 
tried in the following order: 
(1) Misdemeanor cases when defendant is in 
custody; 
(2) Felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
(3) Felony cases when defendant is on bail or 
recognizance; and 
(4) Misdemeanor cases when defendant is on 
bail or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the 
defendant waives a jury in open court with the ap-
proval of the court and the consent of the prosecution. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury 
unless the defendant makes written demand at least 
ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. 
No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial 
jury shall be as specified in Section 78-46-5. 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, 
with the consent of the accused and the approval of 
the court, by stipulation in writing or made orally in 
open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in 
progress with any number of jurors less than other-
wise required. 
(g) After the jury has been impanelled and sworn, 
the trial shall proceed in the following order: 
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the 
defendant stated; 
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an 
opening statement and the defense may make an 
opening statement or reserve it until the prosecu-
tion has rested; ^ 
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in sup-
port of the charge; 
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the de-
fense may present its case; 
(5) Thereafter, th«j parties may offer only re-
butting evidence u n h s s the court, for good cause, 
otherwise permits; 
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any 
other appropriate time, the court shall instruct 
the jury; and 
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury 
on either side or on both sides without argument, 
the prosecution shall open the argument, the de-
fense shall follow and the prosecution may close 
by responding to the defense argument. The 
court may set reasonable limits upon the argu-
ment of counsel for each party and the time to be 
allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified 
during trial and an alternate juror has been selected, 
the case shall proceed using the alternate juror. If no 
alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate 
to proceed with the number of jurors remaining. Oth-
erwise, the jury shall be discharged and a new trial 
ordered. 
(i) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for 
the jury to view the place in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, or in which any 
other material fact occurred, it may order them to be 
conducted in a body under the charge *>f an officer to 
the place, which shall be shown to them by some per-
son appointed by the court for that purpose. The offi-
cer shall be sworn that while the jury are thus con-
ducted, he will suffer no person other than the person 
so appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on 
any subject connected with the trial and to return 
them into court without unnecessary delay or at a 
specified time. 
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors 
are permitted to separate or are sequestered, they 
shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty 
not to converse among themselves or to converse 
with, or suffer themselves to be addressed by, any 
other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is 
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon 
until the case is finally submitted to them. 
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may 
take with them the instructions of the court and all 
exhibits and papers which have been received as evi-
dence, except depositions; and each juror may also 
take with him any notes of the testimony or other 
proceedings taken by himself, but none taken by any 
other person. 
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, 
they shall be kept together in some convenient place 
under charge of an officer until they agree upon a 
verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by 
the court. Except by order of the court, the officer 
having them under his charge shall not allow any 
communication to be made to them, or make any him-
self, except to ask them if they have agreed upon 
their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is 
rendered, communicate to any person the state of 
their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon. 
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if 
they desire to be informed on any point of law arising 
in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of 
them, who shall communicate such request to the 
court. The court may then direct that the jury be 
brought before the court where, in the presence of the 
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond 
to the inquiry or advise the jury that no further in-
structions shall be given. Such response shall be re-
corded. The court may in its discretion respond to the 
inquiry in writing without having the jury brought 
before the court, in which case the inquiry and re-
sponse thereto shall be entered in the record. 
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on 
its face, it may be corrected by the jury under the 
advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again. 
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prose-
cution, or at the conclusion of all of the evidence, the 
court may issue an order dismissing any information 
or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground 
that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish 
the offense charged therein or any lesser included 
offense. 1962 
77-35-18. Rule 18 — Select ion of j u ry . 
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number 
of the jurors that are to try the cause plus such an 
additional number as will allow for all peremptory 
challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause 
sustained, another juror shall be called to fill the va-
cancy before further challenges are made, and any 
such new juror may be challenged for cause. When 
the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk 
shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each 
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate 
thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a 
time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all 
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The 
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many 
of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, in 
the order in which they appear on the list, and the 
persons whose names are so called shall constitute 
the jury. 
